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ABSTRACT 
Corruption is endemic in emerging economies, where many 
transactions of private citizens with government institutions 
require payment of bribes. The Bribecaster web application 
enables citizens to report and consume corruption 
information about dealing with government offices. 
Bribecaster uses a novel privacy-preserving implicit login 
schema and one-way hashing for protecting user identities 
while simultaneously ensuring the accuracy and integrity of 
reports. This citizen-induced transparency facilitates 
rational social and individual responses to corruption. 
Participants in our first-use user study of Bribecaster rated 
the system highly for its usefulness. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A significant percentage of the world’s population lives in 
developing countries and corruption is a major problem in 
many such countries. For example, India has made fighting 
corruption a key component of its development strategy [7]. 
Corruption is a two-sided problem. People in positions of 
power demand bribes for performing or expediting work. 
Individuals and corporations pay these bribes, which are 
often considered part of normal business practices in the 
developing world [7, 11]. Quotidian corruption frequently 
involves paying petty bribes to low and mid-level officials, 
e.g., in law enforcement, government offices, or to tax and 
license inspectors [7]. 
Many efforts to stem corruption focus on punitive action 
against corrupt officials. This top-down approach does not 
currently work in most developing countries [4]. Could a 
bottom-up approach—where citizens exchange corruption 
information with each other—be more effective? To 
motivate our research, we conducted a formative corruption 
survey of 102 Indian participants; results indicate that 
individuals who have had to pay bribes are open to 
reporting corruption information. Our research investigates 
whether bribe market transparency can be achieved by a 
confidential bribe-reporting application. 
We are developing Bribecaster, an application that enables 
community members to anonymously report their 
interactions with government functionaries. Reporting has 
two principal benefits: first, surfacing information about the 
bribe market can empower individuals to make rational 
choices (e.g., deciding to seek out a different office, or 
deciding how much to pay) [3]. Secondly, transparency can 
draw public attention to egregious violations. Such scrutiny 
may ultimately lead to a decrease in corruption levels. We 
are initially targeting India, because of our team’s 
experience, India’s significant English speaking population, 
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Figure 1: The frontpage of the Bribecaster web app shows a 
feed of new bribes, our anonymity policy, and a streamlined 
reporting form. 
 and its democratic government, which should be receptive 
to anti-corruption measures [2].  
We are specifically interested in collecting information 
about harassment bribes. Harassment bribes are a subset of 
bribes where the payment is essentially mandatory 
following a legitimate process (i.e., rules are not bent, but a 
bribe is demanded from people so that they can get what 
they are legally entitled to). Such bribes are pervasive in the 
developing world. For example, getting a tax refund often 
involves paying a part of the refund as a kickback [6]. 
In the current legal framework in countries like India, both 
paying and accepting bribes is illegal. Basu et al. have 
suggested how this leads to a convergence of interests 
between the bribe payer and the bribe taker. They advocate 
political and legal change to make it legal to give bribes 
(while retaining the illegality of taking bribes). This 
divergence of interests will lead to a better “mutual 
check”—officials are less likely to demand bribes when the 
payer has no incentive not to report it. 
While the political and legal change is being suggested by 
government economists [6], it is unlikely to be realized 
given the lack of political will to affect such change. 
Politicians are often a part of the corruption chain where 
slices of bribes collected by lower officials are passed up 
the government hierarchy, all the way to the top elected 
officials. A system such as Bribecaster provides an 
alternative—by enabling individuals to report their bribe 
experiences anonymously and in a public forum, thus 
shielding the reporter from legal action while publically 
broadcasting their experiences. This introduces a key 
challenge in the design of the Bribecaster system – 
protecting the reporters’ privacy. This objective supersedes 
all others. 
BACKGROUND 
In order to evaluate the utility and feasibility of Bribecaster 
before building the system, and to inform our design, we 
deployed a formative survey to gain insight about the 
prevalence of corruption in India, the willingness to report 
and share information about it, and the current technology 
environment. The survey was deployed on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, which has a large Indian workforce. We 
collected 102 responses over 2 days, paying each 
participant $0.25. Our results have a potential bias in that 
respondents may be more tech-savvy than the general 
population. However, we have no reason to believe that 
participants will show a systematic bias regarding 
corruption behavior. 
The key findings of the survey were: 
Most Respondents Pay Bribes 
90% (92/102) of respondents indicated that they had given 
bribes in the past, and over 82% (84/102) identified specific 
individuals to whom they had paid bribes. Figure 1 shows 
transactions that often required bribes. These data indicate 
that corruption is pervasive. Results also indicate that 
harassment bribes are common – for example, over 30% of 
users paid a bribe to get a passport. 
Respondents Use Outside Information to Price Bribes 
We asked participants about how they determined the price 
to pay for a bribe. 60% (56/92) of those who paid a bribe 
indicated the official provided a number; 41% indicated that 
their friends told them the amount, and 40% indicated that a 
middleman (commonly referred to as an “agent”) told them 
the appropriate amount (Figure 3). Agents are valuable 
because they know who to bribe and how much to pay. 
Such information could also be obtained through a 
crowdsourced database of bribe reports, and provides an 
important incentive to consume information from a system 
like Bribecaster. 
Respondents Already Share Their Bribe Experiences 
We next asked about existing forms of bribe-related 
information exchange. 52% had told friends or relatives 
about paying bribes because they felt bad about the 
transaction; 34% told others to keep them informed. Only 
14% did not report paying a bribe because they felt 
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 embarrassed. The high level of informal sharing, and the 
low level of embarrassment about paying bribes suggest 
that users may be willing to share information 
electronically. 
Respondents Are Wary of Anonymous Information 
When explicitly asked if subjects would anonymously 
report bribes through a website or mobile application, 58% 
responded positively. Would respondents use anonymous 
bribe information? Figure 4 shows that of those who had 
valid answers, 22% indicated yes, while 78% indicated no. 
More people are willing to report bribes than are willing to 
use this information. We speculate that this result may be 
due to a lack of trust in anonymous reporting. We conclude 
that the trade-off between trust and anonymity is a key 
design consideration. 
RELATED WORK 
The goal of our research is to learn how to build systems 
that can foster trustworthy knowledge exchange between 
anonymous users in sensitive situations. The Bribecaster 
application provides a platform on which to run studies to 
investigate issues of trust and anonymity. There are both 
commercial apps and academic research on corruption. 
IPaidABribe.com [3] is a website for collecting bribe-
related citizen information, and Bribespot [1] is an iPhone 
app for similar purpose. Both these applications are focused 
on reporting bribes, but don’t provide finely grained bribe 
information that will be useful for when having to pay a 
bribe, and don’t address the tension between anonymity and 
trust.  
Specifically, the IPaidABribe site has similar reporting 
structure to the Bribecaster interface, but different 
objectives, mechanisms and philosophy. IPaidABribe 
provides no explicit anonymity guarantees to bribe 
reporters. Instead, its privacy policy states that it will 
willingly provide information to state actors and law 
enforcement. The site then deals with the apparent illegality 
of such reports by rendering them toothless – official names 
and offices are (perhaps manually) redacted from the 
reports. Thus, the principal operating mechanism appears to 
be to “not ruffle the feathers” and is bound to remain 
largely ineffectual in affecting change. In contrast, the 
Bribecaster system attempts to protect the reporters by 
anonymizing their reports, and relies on crowdsourcing to 
filter out false reports. 
Prior research [10] has focused on creating trust in 
decentralized anonymity networks, but our problem of 
having a centralized server and a web-based user interface 
is not addressed. Yelp.com uses a filter [5] to display only 
the most trusted reviews, but their algorithm relies on the 
existence of trusted users—something that we cannot use in 
an anonymous system. Linguistic-based methods have been 
developed to detect fraudulent reviews on web sites [8]. 
While these techniques are for reviews, we may be able to 
modify their methods to identify fake bribe reports. 
INTERFACE 
The Bribecaster web app allows users to search for and 
report transactions. The frontpage (Figure 1) shows recent 
bribes in an updating stream and map display, and provides 
both search and reporting forms.  
The reporting form asks for the type of transaction, its 
location, the involved official name/position, the amount of 
the bribe if any, and an extended comment about the 
transaction. The location and transaction type information is 
completed based on existing entries in our database. 
Additionally, the location suggestions also include nearby 
locations. These are obtained by using the “nearby 
locations” feature Google Places API, where the reporter’s 
location is computing by using an IP to City Name mapping 
database (PyGeoIP). This autocomplete functionality is 
provided throughout the Bribecaster service. 
Search is the primary navigation mechanism provided by 
the Bribecaster system. Users can search for bribes based 
on a specific location, which defaults to their current 
location (computed via IP geolocation).  
Each office has its own page (Figure 5), which shows either 
all bribes at that location, or that location’s transactions 
filtered by some keywords. The top of the page features an 
interactive graph built with d3.js that allows the user to see 
how bribe amounts for transactions have changed over 
time. Selecting a report type in the right column restricts the 
graph and the listed transactions to only those that match 
that type. Each report contains thumbs up / thumbs down 
buttons that give users indicators of whether others users 
found the reports useful and reliable. This is a key construct 
– we are relying on users of the website to provide signals 
Figure 5: An office-specific page features and interactive 
graph of pricing trends, the ability to restrict to certain types 
of transactions, and buttons to vote for the helpfulness of each 
report. 
 for other users about the veracity and usability of the 
reports. 
Location pages with and without keyword filtering have 
human-readable permalinks for easy sharing. Individual 
transactions have dedicated pages as well. Location pages 
also contain a direct link to report additional transactions at 
that location. 
By restricting our system to just a few easy-to-understand 
page types, we hope that users will have a cohesive and 
streamlined user experience. 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Scalability & Modularity 
Bribecaster is built on the python web framework web.py 
and runs on Amazon EC2. Applications like Bribecaster 
have to potential to go viral, so the scalability of EC2 is 
vital to our implementation. The EC2 server handles the 
back-end and maintains the database. At the moment there 
are two application front-ends that access this server: an 
Android app (not discussed here) and a web application, 
which we use for our studies. The modularity provided by 
this server makes it straightforward to extend Bribecaster to 
new web-enabled platforms. Figure 6 shows our system 
architecture. Additionally, the EC2 servers are based in the 
United States, and provide a certain level of physical 
security. 
Protection 
In order to ensure that users maintain their privacy when 
using Bribecaster, we have implemented various 
protections. Users who visit the web application are not 
tracked using conventional methods like cookies and logins, 
which are potentially incriminating indicators of 
participation. While we do not expect repercussions for 
users who merely browse the site, we hope to protect those 
who submit sensitive information. Instead, a submitted 
transaction report is indexed using a one-way hash of the 
user’s IP address, which then serves as an “implicit login” 
on behalf of the user. Note that using this means that there 
is no known way for any individual (including the site 
administrators) to decode a submitter’s IP address. This 
way we can control against spam—e.g. someone posting 
several fictional reviews to maliciously affect (boost or 
degrade) the reputation of an office—by disallowing similar 
reports from identical hashes. Proxies can get around this 
barrier, but it provides a rudimentary layer of both quality 
assurance and protection in our system. 
We also have an SSL enabled version of the site that 
protects against man in the middle attacks. These attacks 
might be orchestrated by ISPs on behalf of the local law 
enforcement. 
Data Model & Search 
Bribecaster uses a MySQL database with python 
SQLAlchemy wrappers to provide an object relational 
mapping for our data. Our data model has two classes of 
objects: transactions—which cover both bribes and bribe-
free dealings—and offices/locations. Using IP geolocation 
and the Google Places API, we allow users to search for 
locations that are near them. When transactions are added, 
their locations are added to our database if they are not yet 
present. This method uses Google Places to supplement 
location search, but does not rely on it completely because 
we maintain a local database of locations. 
The Bribecaster server features a search provider to 
efficiently search for transactions near locations. Built on 
top of the SQLAlchemy ORM, our search provider returns 
bribe transactions at locations within a given radius of GPS 
coordinates provided by IP geolocation or by city-based 
geolookup. It also facilitates autocomplete for locations in 
both searching and reporting, which improves the user 
experience.  
Malicious Behavior: Prevention and Detection 
By using the implicit weak login of the one-way hashed IP 
address, we can restrict posting of new transaction reports 
for IP addresses that have, in the past k hours, submitted a 
report at that same location. This prevents a malicious 
reporter from artificially inflating or deflating an office’s 
reputation on Bribecaster. The value of  k is currently 12 
hours, but may be modified once Bribecaster is in 
production after an analysis of its traffic patterns. 
EVALUATION 
Figure 6: An overview of Bribecaster's architecture 
 Our system aims to be both trustworthy and useful. If it 
fails to be trustworthy, Bribecaster will not be a credible 
source for bribe-related information. Likewise, if our 
system fails to provide a useful means of navigating and 
learning about bribe transactions, Bribecaster’s 
trustworthiness is irrelevant. For our experiments, we used 
Amazon Mechanical Turk to recruit our target audience—
people from India who have likely taken part in the Bribe-
based economy—to perform tasks using the Bribecaster 
web app and then to complete Likert-scale surveys about 
their experiences. Although a longitudinal study over a few 
years would be the ideal validation of our work, we have 
begun our analysis with multiple experiments to refine and 
evaluate the Bribecaster prototype along key dimensions—
trust, anonymity, usefulness and virality. 
Tension Between Trust and Anonymity 
In a less anonymous system, a user is less likely to lie, but 
also less likely to report sensitive information. So one key 
question is, “what is the right level of submitter information 
to reveal.” Other key questions are: will people feel 
comfortable reporting, will they report the right 
information, and will others trust it. We could handle 
anonymity in three granularities: 
Approach 1 – Complete Anonymity 
Reporter information is kept anonymous, and their IP is 
recorded and stored as a one-way hash to prevent multiple 
entries for the same office. This is the approach we employ 
in our tests and in the current deployment of 
bribecaster.com. 
Approach 2 – Artificial Names 
Artificial names are created as a proxy for the bribe 
reporters. We tie an artificial name to a hashed IP address. 
Approach 3 – Partial Anonymity 
“Reporter by someone in Delhi” style bylines are displayed 
to readers. The location of the bribe reporter is determined 
by their IP address. Will people trust this more? This 
provides more information to the bribe-reader, but the new 
information may be redundant. We could use this approach 
on the back-end to verify that bribe reporters were located 
near the offices in question. 
Will people enter information? 
We have done studies to test whether people are willing to 
enter information into the system.  
Our experiments have included: 
• A/B test of what information people are comfortable 
entering (Official Full Name, Title). In an initial study 
(n=21) we found no statistical indication that users asked 
to enter official names when reporting bribes felt any 
difference in safety on the web site. 
• A/B test of what information about our privacy controls 
we need to reveal and feature on our website. In an initial 
study (n=19), we found that users that we did not explain 
the protection features to felt safer and trusted the site 
more, but the t-test results were not significant (p=.47). 
This seems to fit the classic adage, “ignorance is bliss.” 
• A/B test of “institutional flow of trust,” i.e., Berkeley 
hosting this as opposed to it being run locally. Does the 
user care about this? (RELEVANT?) 
We rely on Likert scales for many of these results as a 
proxy for a true longitudinal study. 
In the future we will test how upvotes and downvotes affect 
readers. We test this by informing bribe-reporters and 
viewers that the average bribe report gets 4 positive reviews 
(and perhaps sending them an email when they get positive 
ratings). After this, we can measure traffic to particular 
bribe pages as a metric of interest. Surveys can then be used 
to determine how people interpret the rankings. 
Virality 
The success of a two-sided system such as Bribecaster 
depends on its adoption by a critical mass of people. We 
would like a high virality factor, i.e., the willingness of 
users to recommend the system to other users, which is a 
Figure 7: Results of A/B tests on Mechanical Turk that test how users react to different features of the site. These charts show the 
mean and standard deviations of responses on a Likert scale (1- strongly disagree, 5 – strongly agree) 
 proxy for future success of Bribecaster. We use the Net 
Promoter Score (NPS) [9] metric to gauge the virality of 
the system. NPS is also proxy for how useful users find the 
system to be.  The NPS is determined by asking users the 
following question on the scale, 0: not at all likely, to 10: 
extremely likely: How likely are you to recommend 
Bribecaster to a friend, colleague, or relative? NPS is 
defined as the number of 9's and 10's minus the number of 
0-6 responses. We use the net promoter score as a success 
metric as we continue to develop and tweak the system. In 
Figure 8 we plot the NPS as we add and remove features. 
NPS is generally considered a important virality metric. 
However, in our case, users were recruited from 
Mechanical Turk and paid for participating in our studies. 
Users may have been attempting to please us by responding 
favorably to this question. However, we do notice relative 
variations among the net promoter scores. For example, 
participants of the study who were asked to enter multiple 
reports maliciously, and failed showed a higher net 
promoter score (30) than in other tests. This indicates that 
the NPS serves as a useful proxy for even paid users. In 
general, our NPS scores trended upwards and helped us 
refine our design.  
Usefulness, Engagement and User-Retention 
We tracked the general level of engagement of the users in 
a free form searching and browsing task. On average, a user 
performed over 6 searches, although we prompted the user 
to perform 5 searches or fewer. Figure 9 shows a histogram 
of the number of searches that were performed.  
Additionally, across all our studies, the average participant 
(n=122) spent 8.25 minutes on the website. Again, this is 
quite high. Our bounce rate was about 28.22% and 
participants visited 9.06 pages on average.  
Additionally, we received many ideas and suggestions from 
study participants indicating a high level of enthusiasm. 
Several users remarked that the website was very useful. 
One user suggested reaching out to the local media to 
popularize the website. Users also gave design 
suggestions—one user suggested improving the design of 
the website to make it look professional so that it appears 
more trustworthy. Other users suggested changes to format 
and layout.  
Malicious Intent Detection & Prevention 
If successful, the Bribecaster system is likely to attract 
malicious users. The key attack we have to guard against is 
that in which one individual or sets of individuals report 
incorrect data with an intent to malign another individual or 
office. Conversely, multiple reports might be filed to 
embellish offices with positive reports and to drown out 
offices and officials with legitimate positive reports. Our 
key strategy is to limit the number of reports that an 
individual (or a group of related individuals) can file. 
One-Person, One-Vote 
We currently use the users IP address as a weak implicit 
login. A given IP can only submit one report for a given 
office, task, from a given IP addresses. Since we store a 
one-way hash of the IP address, we can easily determine 
this. Currently, we explicitly reject such reports, i.e., the 
user is informed that their report was not registered. In the 
future, we intend to silently reject it, i.e., to store the report 
but to not display it or use it in aggregate computations. 
Similarly, a user can only upvote or downvote an existing 
report only once. 
The IP based scheme has obvious limitations – users can 
use multiple different computers, call their friends and ask 
them to submit reports. Additionally, users using a cyber-
café might be needlessly restricted from reporting such 
bribes. We recognize such limitations, but believe that such 
constraints are likely not dominant factors. 
Hypothesis: An IP-restricted reporting mechanism is an 
effective, good-enough mechanism for malicious bribe 
reporting. 
In a tasks posted on Amazon Mechanical Turk, we asked 
participants to post multiple bribes for the same task and 
office. Participants were prompted to use any means 
necessary. We explicitly stated that users would be paid for 
successfully reporting a given bribe instance, and not 
penalized for using any potential mechanism. We paid 
participants $0.25 for attempting the task, and offered a 
bonus ($0.50) for each multiple report they filed (up to 6 
bribes for $3). 
Of the 10 users who participated in the study, 1 user was 
able to insert 3 bribes. The remaining 9 users spent an 
median of 8.2 minutes (with some users spending as much 
as 18 minutes) but did not succeed. The one user who 
succeeded reported using an online proxy (Ultrasurf.com).  
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Figure 8: The change in Net Promoter Score over time, as 
features are added and removed 
 This indicates that while the system is easily beatable, a 
majority of non-technical users are unlikely to be able to 
easily fool with our present defenses. We also note that 
these users were sourced from Mechanical Turk, and are 
likely more technically competent than the typical user. 
Interestingly, over 54% of users browsed Bribecaster with 
Chrome, indicating a more technically competent set of 
people than those using the default browser.  
We will continue to monitor and institute additional 
defenses as the threat model evolves. One approach would 
involve restricting reports to the same province as where 
the office is located (based on the reporting IPs), and to 
blacklist proxy IP addresses. 
De-anonymization attacks 
Another class of attacks attempts to decipher the reporting 
person based on the amount and the modus-operandi 
reported. We currently offer no protection against such 
attacks, but we are planning on preventing them in the 
future. The core idea would be to initially reveal aggregate 
statistics for a given office/location, and selectively reveal 
more information as more reports are filed. For example, 
the official names may be revealed only when more than 
half a dozen reports are filed, or when more than 3 reports 
name the same official. 
We also believe that given the nature of reports, i.e., 
commonplace everyday tasks, it is likely to be common 
enough that data based de-anonymization attacks will be 
ineffective. 
FUTURE WORK 
Bribecaster as an information source 
We intend to provide the name and contact information of 
associated with a particular office. We will also provide 
information of the chain of command, and provide a public 
mechanism to enable users to contact these officials. 
Further, given enough data, we will be able to detect the 
change in bribe levels as a new official in transferred into 
our out-of a job. By creating a public ‘corruption index’ of 
administrators, we hope to discourage bribe taking. 
Additionally, providing this information also assists in 
“seeding” the site, i.e., making it useful without having to 
have a lot of initial reviews to begin with. 
A Positive System 
Bribecaster is currently focused on reporting bribe 
instances. It has a negative skew in that it collects reports of 
corruption in day-to-day life. Because of this negativity, 
questions of security and trust are important to consider. In 
order to skirt these issues, we could re-imagine the system 
as a primarily positive site, a sort of “Linked-In” for public 
officials. Users could leave reports of positive transactions 
and write brief notes of recommendation for officials. If an 
official had no recommendations on the site, a user could 
assume that the official was corrupt or in some way 
untrustworthy. None of the information in this system 
would need to be private or protected because there is no 
negative information shared, and it might put pressure on 
officials to clean up their acts and collect positive reviews. 
There are a number of issues that would arise here, as well, 
such as ensuring that positive reviews of officials are not 
falsified, but it may be easier to accomplish these goals 
without putting users at risk. 
A Wider Net 
One study participant reported bribes he had to pay to the 
officials at a private educational institution. Others report 
having to pay bribes in non-governmental contexts. We 
intend to extend Bribecaster to cover private organizations. 
We also intend to deploy Bribecaster for other developing 
regions, particularly Pakistan and parts of Africa. 
Quality Control 
Because we do not have a large user base at the time of 
writing, we have yet to run into issues of quality control. 
However, if the application becomes popular and receives 
an influx of transaction reports, we will need to filter out 
“bad” responses. While typical collaborative applications 
would use a login system to achieve quality standards, the 
sensitive nature of our information prevents that. Instead, 
we will identify patterns using the content of reports paired 
with hashed IP addresses as probabilistic identifiers. 
Sister Cities 
Widespread use of Bribecaster could give rise to social 
incentives for administrators and professionals to lower 
bribes. One idea is to facilitate competition among offices 
and office administrators is to periodically publish some 
corruption index metric. Another approach is to create 
competition with sister cities in neighboring countries or 
regions. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper we presented the Bribecaster service that 
enables individuals in the developing world to safely and 
Figure 9: Users in the free form tasks searched more than we 
asked them to. 
 securely report bribe-related transaction information. We 
presented new mechanisms that facilitate privacy control 
while simultaneously guarding against malicious reporting. 
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